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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dwain K. Whitaker appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
a jury verdict finding him guilty of eleven counts of lewd conduct with a child
under 16 and three counts of sexual abuse of a child under 16.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Dwain K. Whitaker's youngest two step-daughters, Ka.P and Ki.P,
disclosed to their mother and the authorities that Whitaker had sexually abused
them over a period of several years.

(PSI, pp.2-3.)

Following interviews and

medical examinations through CARES, the state charged Whitaker with thirteen
counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16, and four counts of sexual abuse of
a child under 16 (exposing his step-daughters to pornography). (Id.; R., pp.1423.)
At the jury trial, both victims testified about the abuse, which was
corroborated by medical examination evidence. (See generally, Tr.) Whitaker
did not testify or present any evidence. (Id.) Following the trial, the jury found
Whitaker guilty of eleven counts of lewd conduct, and three counts of sex abuse,
(R., pp.182-185.) The jury acquitted Whitaker on one of the lewd conduct counts
and one of the sex abuse counts.

(Id.)

dismissed by the state during the trial.

Another lewd conduct count was

(Tr., p.280, L.15 - p.282, L.16.)

The

district court entered unified life sentences, with twenty years fixed, on each of
the lewd conduct convictions, and unified twenty-five year sentences, with twenty

1

years fixed, on each of the sex abuse convictions. (R., pp.209-221.) The district
court ran all of the sentences concurrently. (Id.) Whitaker timely appealed. (R.,
pp.229-231.)

2

ISSUES
Salazar states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it concluded that evidence that
Mr. Whitaker watched pornography was not prior act
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), and, if so, did it err in admitting
that evidence when the State failed to provide the required
pre-trial notice?

2.

Was it fundamental error, in violation of Mr. Whitaker's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to testify, for the State
to argue six times that its evidence was uncontradicted or
uncontroverted?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Whitaker failed to show that the district court erred in admitting
evidence that his wife had observed him viewing pornography on his
home computer?

2.

Has Whitaker failed to show that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct
constitute fundamental error?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
Whitaker Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting
Evidence That His Wife Had Observed Him Viewing Pornography

A

Introduction
Whitaker asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the state to

present evidence that Whitaker's wife had observed him viewing pornography.
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.)

Whitaker contends that this evidence should have

been excluded because it was "prior act" evidence subject to I.R.E. 404(b), and
the state did not provide him the required notice. (Id.) However, because the
evidence was intrinsic to the four charges of sex abuse that alleged Whitaker
exposed his two youngest step-daughters to pornography, it was not a "prior act"
subject to 1.R.E. 404(b) analysis.
Further, even if the evidence was not intrinsic to the crimes charged, and
1.R.E. 404(b) applied, the district court's decision to admit the evidence was
ultimately correct.

Even though the district court expressly declined to apply

1.R.E. 404(b), it did make a relevancy determination in which it recognized that
the evidence was relevant for a purpose beyond criminal propensity. (Tr., p.87,
L.25 - p.94, L.25.) In conducting an I.R.E. 403 analysis, the district court also
properly concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. (Id.) In addition, the nature of the
charges that he exposed his children to pornography, and the victims' testimony
at the preliminary hearing, gave Whitaker sufficient notice that the state intended
to introduce evidence that he had possession of and access to pornography on
4

his home computer. (Prelim Tr., p.74, L.13 - p.76, L.23; p.88, L.15 - p.92, L.12;
R., pp.21-23.)
Finally, even if the district court admitted the evidence in error, such error
was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).

The District Court Did Not Err In Admitting Evidence That Whitaker's Wife
Observed Him Watching Pornography

C.

Evidence of prior acts bearing on a defendant's character is admissible if:
(a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and
(b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by
the orobabilitv of unfair oreiudice associated with character I.RE 404(b)· St::JtP•
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v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The second prong of
this test only excludes evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-276, 77
P.3d 956, 964-965 (2003). This weighing process is "committed to the judge's

5

sound discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800, 802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240
(Ct. App. 1986).
While application of I.R.E. 404(b) is not necessarily limited to "bad" acts, it

is limited to acts which bear on the character of the defendant.

See State v.

Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In Norton's trial for
first-degree arson, the district court admitted evidence that Norton had previously
collected insurance proceeds from an Oregon house fire.

~

The Idaho Court of

Appeals, while recognizing that I.R.E. 404(b) was not limited to "bad acts" or
crimes, also concluded that the fact that Norton's house was burned, and that it
was insured, "[did] not bear on Norton's character, and therefore, [was] not
subject to I.R.E. 404(b)." Norton, 151 Idaho at_, P.3d at 91.
In the present case (which occurred before the opinion in Norton was
issued), the district court concluded that evidence that Whitaker's wife had
observed him viewing pornography was not subject to I.R.E. 404(b), stating:
"[t]he reason for that is that it's not illegal to have adult pornography. I don't think
that fits the definition of a crime or a wrong or an act that is deemed, as that is
used within [1.R.E.] 404."

(Tr., p.93, Ls.9-13.)

The district court ultimately

admitted the evidence after conducting relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses. (Tr.,
p.93, L.14 - p.94, L.25.)
While viewing adult pornography is not illegal, the state concedes that it
may be perceived by a jury to bear on the defendant's character in a way that
collecting insurance proceeds from a house fire does not.

6

Other jurisdictions

have held that the viewing of adult pornography is subject to an analysis
pursuant to those jurisdictions' respective versions of I.R.E. 404(b). 1
Where a district court has reached a right result, that result will be affirmed
on any correct theory. State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 694, 991 P.2d 878, 882
(Ct. App. 1999). In the present case, while the district court's reasoning in not
applying I.R.E. 404(b) was flawed, its decision not to apply the rule was
ultimately correct, because the evidence was not subject to I.R.E. 404(b)
because it was intrinsic to the crimes charged.
Further, even if I.R.E. 404(b) did apply to the evidence, the district court's
relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses of the evidence satisfied the requirements for
admission pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), and this Court can affirm the admission of
the evidence on that basis.
Finally, even if the district court erred in admitting the evidence, that error
was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1.

Evidence That Whitaker Had Pornography On His Computer Was
Intrinsic To The Crimes Charged, And Thus Not Subject To I.R.E.
404(b)

I.R.E. 404(b) "does not extend to evidence of acts which are intrinsic to
-

'

- I

.

-

-

-

the charged offense." State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31
(2008). In Sheldon, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[e]vidence of an act is
1

See State v. Bush, 595 S.E.2d 715, 719-721 (N.C. App. 2004); State v. Coghill,
169 P.3d 942, 946-951 (Ariz. App. Div. 2007); State v. Smith, 568 S.E.2d 289,
292-295 (N.C. App. 2002); State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 509-511 (Ohio Com. Pl.
2008).
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intrinsic when it and evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined,
or both acts are part of a single criminal episode, or it was a necessary
preliminary to the crime charged." ~; See also State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410,
413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1263 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The Idaho appellate courts have held
that I.R.E. 404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct evidence
if the misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that a
complete account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without
disclosure of the uncharged misconduct.") (citing State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667,
670,534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18, 878
P.2d 188, 191-192 (Ct. App. 1994)).
Evidence that Whitaker had possession of and access to pornography on
his computer was both inextricably intertwined with the four charged crimes of
exposing his step-daughters to pornography, and a necessary preliminary to
those charges. It was therefore not subject to I.R.E. 404(b) analysis.
Both of Whitaker's step-daughters testified that Whitaker had exposed
them to pornography from his own computer.
p.234, L.25 - p.248, L.10).

(Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.203, L.9;

The fact that Whitaker actually had access to

pornography on his computer was thus not a "prior bad act," subject to I.R.E.
404(b) analysis, but was instead inextricably intertwined with the charges against
him.

In order for Whitaker to be convicted of those charges, the state was

required to prove that he had access to pornography on his home computer, and
that the access, as observed by his step-daughters, was intentional. Evidence
that Whitaker possessed and had access to pornography on his home computer
8

was, in essence, evidence that Whitaker had possession of the implement he
used to commit the crime - similar to evidence, for example, that a defendant
had possession of the murder weapon in the time surrounding the murder.
The district court's ultimate decision not to apply I.R.E. 404(b) to evidence
that Whitaker had possessed and observed pornography on his computer was
correct (albeit for the wrong reason). Whitaker has thus failed to show that the
district court erred in admitting the evidence.

2.

Even If The Evidence Was Not Intrinsic To The Crime Charged,
The District Court Did Not Err In Admitting It

Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) is a relevance rule. Avila, 137 at 412-413,
49 P.3d at 1262-1263. However, as discussed above, when a state seeks to
admit evidence subject to I.R.E. 404(b), the court must not only determine if the
evidence was relevant for a purpose beyond criminal propensity, it must also
determine, pursuant to I.R.E. 403, whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cross, 132 Idaho at
670, 978 P.2d 227 at 230.
If evidence that Whitaker had possessed and viewed pornography was not
intrinsic to the charges that he exposed his step-daughters to pornography, then
I.R.E. 404(b) applied to the evidence. While the district court was incorrect in
concluding that legal, adult pornography was not subject to I.R.E. 404(b)
because it was not a "bad act," the state did still argue, and the district court still
did recognize, that the evidence was relevant for purposes beyond criminal
propensity. (Tr., p.87, L.25 - p.94, L.25.) In further concluding that the probative
9

value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the district court ultimately conducted an
analysis that satisfied the requirements of admission pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b).
(Id.) Thus, the district court did not ultimately err in admitting the evidence.
The evidence that Whitaker had pornography on his home computer was
plainly admissible for proper 1.R.E 404(b) purposes beyond propensity. Whitaker
was charged with four counts of exposing his two youngest step-daughters to
pornography. (R., pp.21-23.) In determining that the evidence was relevant, the
the district court stated that Whitaker viewing pornography on his computer was
"relevant for a lot of reasons, but among those things, to show the simple
existence of those materials."
prosecutor

argued

(Tr., p.92, Ls.14-18.)

immediately

prior

to

the

Further, as the state

district

court's

relevancy

determination, the evidence corroborated the testimony of the two victims, and
was relevant to show that Whitaker had access to pornography on his computer,
that he knew how to watch it, and that it was not a mistake for Whitaker to show it
to his step-daughters - all permissible purposes beyond propensity. (Tr., p.90,
L.10 - p.91, L.9.)
The state's argument, and the district court's conclusion, was consistent
with State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 823-825, 215 P.3d 538, 543-545 (Ct.
App. 2009).

In Rossignol, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized first that,

"[m]any jurisdictions have concluded that evidence of pornography possessed by
a defendant may be admitted in criminal prosecutions for sexual misconduct to
corroborate a victim's testimony if there is some connection between the
10

pornography and the crime charged." (citations omitted.)

&

The Idaho Court

of Appeals then held that pornographic images and incest stories found on a
defendant's computer were admissible in a trial on charges of lewd conduct and
sex abuse, because they were relevant to, and corroborated, the victim's
testimony thi:tt she was shown pornography prior to and during the sexual abuse.

&

The evidence also helped prove the intent element of the crime.

&

After concluding that the evidence was relevant, the district court then
properly determined, pursuant to I.R.E. 403, that the danger of unfair prejudice of
the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value. (Tr., p.94, Ls.619.) Indeed, the potential of unfair prejudice from evidence that Whitaker had
watched legal adult pornography in view of his wife was minimal in a trial that
also contained evidence that Whitaker had showed pornography to his stepdaughters (Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.203, L.9; p.234, L.25 - p.248, L.10), and had told
a risk assessment worker for the State of Idaho Child Protection that he had
previously had pornography on his computer (Tr., p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.5). The
evidence was thus highly probative for all of the reasons discussed above, but
presented limited risk of unfair prejudice.
Whitaker also had notice that the state would present evidence that he
had pornography on his computer, through the information which charged four
courts of exposing his step-daughters to pornography. (R., pp.21-23.) Whitaker
was aware, from the victims' preliminary hearing testimony, and likely the
discovery materials provided to him prior to trial, that the state was alleging that
Whitaker had shown his step-daughters pornography contained on his own
11

computers. (Prelim Tr., p.74, L.13 - p.76, L.23; p.88, L.15 - p.92, L.12.) While
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that compliance with the I.R.E. 404(b) notice
requirements is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of "other acts"
evidence (State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 (2008)), it has not
expressly required such notice to be specifically provided as formal "I.R.E. 404(b)
notice." Unlike in the present case, there was no indication that Sheldon was
necessarily aware that the state intended to introduce evidence of Sheldon's prior
bad acts (past involvement in methamphetamine trafficking).
While the district court did not perform a formal I.R.E 404(b) analysis, it
concluded, through its relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses, that the evidence was
relevant for purposes beyond propensity, and that the danger of unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value.

The only

remaining requirement for admission through I.R.E. 404(b) was notice, which
Whitaker was provided through the charging information, nature of the charges,
and preliminary hearing testimony. Whitaker has failed to show that the district
court erred in ultimately admitting the evidence that he possessed and viewed
pornography on his home computer.

D.

If The District Court Erred in Admitting The Evidence, Such Error Was
Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52.
"The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have
convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged
12

evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010)
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d
961, 979 (2010).
Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of the evidence
that Whitaker's wife had observed him watching pornography, such error was
clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial reference to Whitaker's wife observing Whitaker watching
pornography was brief and devoid of prejudicial or explicit detail. It consisted of a
single question on direct examination of Whitaker's wife, "[w]hen you were living
in Twin Falls from I guess the end of 2007 until 2009, did you ever see the
defendant watch porn in Twin Falls?" and a single, one-word answer, "[y]es." (Tr.,
p.96, Ls.2-5.) The admission of this brief reference to Whitaker possessing and
viewing pornography on his computer was harmless in light of evidence at the
trial that Whitaker had exposed his step-children to pornography on multiple
occasions, and had, at least on one occasion, masturbated in their presence
during these events. (Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.203, L.9; p.234, L.25 - p.248, L.10) In
addition, at the time Whitaker's wife testified that she had observed Whitaker
watching pornography, a risk assessment worker for State of Idaho Child
Protection had already testified that Whitaker had told her he had previously had
pornography on his computer.

(Tr., p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.5.)

Also, as discussed above, Whitaker had notice, through the nature of the
charges against him, and the victims' preliminary hearing testimony, that the
13

state intended to present evidence about Whitaker's access to and use of
pornography on his home computer Thus, Whitaker's wife's testimony could not
have come as a surprise to Whitaker, and it did not prejudice his defense.
Clearly, the critical evidence in the trial was the testimony of Whitaker's
two youngest step-daughters, who testified in graphic detail about the years of
abuse they suffered at Whitaker's hands. (Tr., p.149, L.20 - p.300, L.3.) The
jury necessarily found the childrens' testimony credible in finding Whitaker guilty
of fourteen felony sex offenses. (R., pp.182-185.) It is true beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury's credibility determination about the victims' extensive
testimony was not entirely dependent upon evidence that Whitaker's wife had
observed him watching legal, adult pornography on his own home computer.
Evidence that Whitaker possessed and viewed pornography on his home
computer was intrinsic to the charged crimes of exposing his step-daughters to
pornography, and was thus was not a "prior act" subject to I.R.E. 404(b) analysis.
Even if the evidence was not intrinsic to the charged crimes, and thus subject to
404(b ), the district court did not err in ultimately admitting it, because its
relevancy and I.R.E. 403 analyses satisfied the I.R.E. 404(b) requirements for
;::irlmissinn_

Finally, even if the district court erred in admitting the testimony,

such error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should
thus affirm Whitaker's conviction.

14

11.
Whitaker Has Failed To Show That His Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Constitute Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Whitaker claims that closing rebuttal argument

remarks made by the prosecutor at his criminal trial constituted prosecutorial
misconduct of such an egregious nature that he is entitled to a new trial.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Whitaker failed to raise this issue below. Since this
issue was not preserved for appeal, to prevail Whitaker must demonstrate that
not only do the comments constitute prosecutorial misconduct, but that that
misconduct constitutes fundamental error.

Whitaker has failed to meet this

burden, and his appeal must therefore be denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error.

C.

&

at 980.

Whitaker Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument
The Fifth Amendment guarantees "[nJo person ... shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself... "

15

U.S. Const. amend. V.

Therefore, neither a prosecutor nor a trial judge may comment to the jury on a
defendant's failure to testify at trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Whitaker contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and violated his
Fifth Amendment rights during her closing argument rebuttal by referring to
certain evidence as "uncontroverted" on several occasions.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.7-14.) There was no objection to the comments at trial.
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perry, unobjected to
claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in
most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings.
150 Idaho at

, 245 P.3d at 978.

Application of the foregoing standard to Whitaker's claim of error
demonstrates he has failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Perry
analysis, and has thus failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to
reversa! of his conviction.

1. Whitaker Has Failed To Demonstrate That One Or More Of His
Unwaived Constitutional Rights Were Violated
Whitaker claims the prosecutor indirectly referenced his decision not to
testify when she described certain evidence as "uncontroverted" during her
rebuttal argument, and that this violated his Fifth Amendment rights. (Appellant's
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brief, pp.7-14.)

However, a review of the context of the statements reveals that

the prosecutor was not indirectly referring to Whitaker's decision not to testify, but
was responding to Whitaker's counsel's attacks on the state's evidence made
during his own closing argument. Whitaker has thus failed to demonstrate that
his constitutional rights were violated.
The law is well-settled that a prosecutor may comment on or reference a
defendant's failure to present evidence and witnesses as long as the defendant's
right to silence is not violated. In State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591-92, 671
P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Turning first to the prosecutor's remark that state witness Server's
testimony was "uncontradicted," we hold that it does not constitute
an impermissible reference to the defendant's failure to testify.
Rather it is a comment on the weight of the evidence produced: the
state presented expert testimony by one who had chemically tested
the substance found in defendant's possession and determined it to
be cocaine; the defense, on the other hand, presented no evidence
-- by means of expert testimony or otherwise -- tending to contradict
the state's suggested conclusion that the substance was cocaine.
There was no implication that defendant himself had some
obligation to take the witness stand (and was admitting guilt by not
doing so). As stated by the California Supreme Court,
"Griffin [v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)] forbids
either direct or indirect comment upon the failure of
the defendant to take the witness stand. The rule,
however, does not ex.tend to comments on the state
of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to
introduce material evidence or to call logical
witnesses." People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264, 168
Cal.Rptr. 603, 623, 618 P.2d 149, 169 (1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 1750, 68 L.Ed.2d
232 (1981 ).
(Emphasis added.) See also State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d
400, 402 (Ct. App. 2006) (reiterating statement in Hodges); see United States v.
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Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9 th Cir. 1994) (prosecutors are entitled to call
attention to the defendant's failure to present exculpatory evidence more
generally).

Under Hodges, a prosecutor can properly draw attention to a

defendant's failure to "introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses"
without violating the defendant's right to silence. Hodges, 105 Idaho at 591-92,
671 P.2d at 1054-55.
Whitaker does not challenge any portion of the prosecutor's initial closing
argument.

In his own closing argument, W~1itaker's counsel attempted to cast

doubt on the credibility of Whitaker's step-daughters' trial testimony. (Supp Tr.,
p.22, L.1 - p.49, L.6.)

He questioned whether the step-daughters' courtroom

affect or demeanor was consistent with their allegations. (Supp Tr., p.23, L.13 p.25, L.12.) He hypothesized that medical examination evidence that indicated
that the step-daughters had been sexually active may have come from sexual
experiences independent of Whitaker. (Supp. Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.30, L.6.) He
suggested that Ka.P.'s inability to remember the time of year or time of day of
one of the instances of abuse spoke poorly of her credibility. (Supp. Tr., p.38,
L.23 - p.39, L.22.) He questioned Ka.P.'s testimony that when Whitaker exposed
her to pornography on a projector connected to his computer, chairs were set up
under the projector, when other evidence indicated that the projector had recently
been inoperable and that the chairs were instead against the wall. (Supp. Tr.,
p.44, Ls.2-12.) He argued that Ka.P.'s testimony that she had gotten the abuse
to stop on one occasion by simply telling W~1itaker to stop was "controverted" by
other evidence or arguments that Ka.P. was scared during Whitaker's abuse,
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and by evidence that Whitaker had used money and candy to persuade his stepdaughters not to disclose the abuse. (Supp. Tr., p.42, Ls.16-25.)
During her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor addressed Whitaker's
counsel's attack on the victims' testimony, arguing that the evidence was not
internally inconsistent as Whitaker's counsel had argued, but was in fact
"uncontroverted":
It's important to note that [Whitaker's defense counsel] was
not able to impeach [Ki.P.] about anything she said about Dwain
Whitaker. He may not agree with her, but that's not impeachment.
The evidence is uncontroverted that Dwain Whitaker put his naked
penis in [Ki.P.'s] vagina. Now [Ki.P.] was in her room. She was in
his room. She was in the bathroom. She was in the motor home
on Quincy. She was in the motor home on Monroe. I asked you at
the very beginning, listen to how the defense explains away the
allegations. I asked you, how do you explain that away?
There is no history in the prior medical history of [Ki.P.] that
there was any kind of trauma, that she had been injured in any
way in her vaginal area. There is uncontroverted evidence that
Dwain Whitaker showed her pornography in the basement TV
room, as well as in the front room. Now remember the projector
got turned off a couple of months before she put a stop to this. In
other words, it got turned off early, somewhere in the middle of her
sixth grade year. That would explain why she got to see porn in
the front room. That would also explain why [Ka.P.] never saw
porn in the basement but saw it upstairs in the bathroom or saw it
in the defendant's bedroom.
lt's uncontroverted that Dwain Whitaker had sexual contact
with [Ka.P.] [Ka.P.'s] testimony is that he touched her with his bare
penis at night because, you remember, she was asleep. So I
guess she does remember whether this was day or night. And the
first time he touched her with his - touched her vagina, one, with
his hand, she was wearing pajamas and underwear. She woke up
because her pajama bottoms and her underwear was off. The
second time he touched her bare Vqgina was with his penis. And if
you remember, this time she remembers she was wearing her night
shirt and her underwear.
19

There is no controverted evidence that this did not happen in
her bedroom or that it happened in his room. The evidence is
uncontroverted that she was shown pornography in the bathroom.
One of those times when he was showing her pornography, do
you remember what he did? He began to masturbate until he
ejaculated. The evidence is uncontroverted that he had [Ka.P.]
touch his penis and that when she would do that he would move
her hand up and down, that he would ejaculate. [Ka.P.] was not
She didn't change her
inconsistent in her testimony either.
testimony in any way. It's just that [Whitaker's defense counsel]
doesn't believe what she said.
(Supp. Tr., p.55, L.25 - p.57, L.22.) Later in the prosecutor's rebuttal argument,
she responded to Whitaker's defense counsel's proposed hypothetical that one
of Whitaker's step-daughters was sexually active. The prosecutor stated:
Do [Ki.P. and Ka.P.] look moxie as [Whitaker's defense
counsel] says?
Do they look like they're sexually active?
[Whitaker's defense counsel] asked you, is asking you to produce
imaginary facts or scenario[s]. He even said let's just imagine.
There is no evidence put on by the state or in cross of any of
[Whitaker's defense counsel's] imaginary facts or imaginary
scenarios. Remember, reasonable doubt is not imaginary doubt.
(Supp Tr., p.62, Ls.14-21 (emphasis added).)
It is apparent from the context of the prosecutor's entire rebuttal argument
that in referring to certain evidence as "uncontroverted," she was not indirectly
referring to Whitaker's decision not to testify at trial, she was responding to
V\/hitaker's defense counsel's argument about the strength of the evidence. The
prosecutor was attempting to distinguish the actual evidence presented at trial
from Whitaker's counsel's proposed hypotheticals and attacks on the victims'
credibility.

The prosecutor was also arguing that the victims did not, as

Whitaker's counsel suggested, contradict themselves, and that their testimony
was thus "uncontroverted" in that manner. The state even specifically once
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referenced the lack of state's evidence of Whitaker's defense counsel's
"imaginary facts or imaginary scenarios." (Supp Tr., p.62, Ls.14-21.) Finally, the
prosecutor never referred specifically to uncontroverted "testimony," which may
have indirectly referenced Whitaker's decision not to testify himself, but instead
referred to unconverted evidence, which further supports the reasonable
interpretation that the prosecutor was responding to Whitaker's counsel's attacks
on the evidence, as opposed to Whitaker's decision not to testify.
While Whitaker would have this Court assume the most damning possible
interpretation of the prosecutor's comments during closing argument, an
examination of the context reveals a more reasonable interpretation, that the
prosecutor did not indirectly comment on Whitaker's decision not to testify at the
jury trial, but was instead directly commenting on the strength of the state's
evidence. Therefore, Whitaker has failed to show that his constitutional rights
were violated, and has failed to meet the first prong of the Perry fundamental
error analysis.

2. Whitaker Has Failed To Show That Any Alleged Error Was Clear Or
Obvious, Or That The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical Decision
Fnr
m:=inv
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discussed
above.
Whitaker cannot show anv
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Fifth Amendment violation was "clear or obvious." Whitaker cannot show that the
jury interpreted the prosecutor's rebuttal as indirectly commenting on his right to
silence.
Further, Whitaker also cannot show that his trial counsel's decision not to
object during the closing argument was based on ignorance of the law or other
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objective shortcomings, as opposed to being merely a tactical decision. In fact,
the record belies any claim that the failure to object was based on his counsel's
ignorance of the law.

In Whitaker's counsel's own closing argument, prior to

when the prosecutor made the statements at issue during her rebuttal argument,
he discussed the "white elephant sitting out there," that his client had not testified
at trial. (Supp. Tr., p.26, L.13 - p.27, L.25.) Whitaker's counsel noted that this
was an issue "that actually the prosecutor has not really been able to comment
upon," referred to the jury instruction requiring jurors not to hold a defendant's
decision not to testify against him, and discussed the difficulty of a defendant
obtaining evidence to present in this type of case. (Id.) Whitaker's counsel was
clearly aware of and sensitive to the issue of Whitaker's decision not to testify,
and not ignorant to Whitaker's Fifth Amendment rights.
Whitaker has failed to show that any alleged error was "clear or obvious,"
or that his trial counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's rebuttal was
based on any ignorance of the law or objective shortcomings.

Whitaker has

therefore failed to meet the second prong of the fundamental error analysis.

3.

Whitaker Has Failed To Demonstrate That Any Alleged Error
Affected The Q11tcornP. Of The Trial Proceedinas

Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct
is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or
could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d
127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923
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(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985).

In this case, even

assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct by indirectly referencing
Whitaker's decision not to testify, an objection and curative instruction made after
the prosecutor's first reference to "uncontroverted" evidence would have easily
remedied any potential for the jury to make inappropriate inferences from the
comments, and would have prevented subsequent use of terms such as
"uncontroverted ."
The district court clearly instructed the jury that it was not to draw any
inference of guilt from Whitaker's decision not to testify at trial. (R., p.178.) A
jury should not be assumed to have utterly disregarded a direct instruction not to
make such a negative inference, and instead be assumed to have been so
influenced by a prosecutor's possible indirect reference to a defendant's silence
as to disregard those specific and direct instructions. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,
481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996) (An appellate court presumes that the
jury followed the district court's instructions.).
V\Jhitaker, who must satisfy a!! three prongs of the Perrv fundamental error

analysis, has failed to meet any of them.

He has therefore failed to show

fundamental error in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found Whitaker guilty of eleven counts of lewd and lascivious
conduct, and three counts of sex abuse.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2011.
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